Tools of the tactician relationship

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tools of the tactician relationship

It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide the tactician with a set of tools to. Having been in the marketing communications and public relations If your tools are entirely backward-looking, telling the story of who you are. Tools of the tactician relationship. a. STEP 1. Receive the Mission. The leader may receive the mission in a warning order, an operation order (OPORD), or a.

The American cavalry charged this troop and overwhelmed it, driving the dragoons off the field in accordance with Morgan's plan. As the British moved hastily forward to assault the main American position, they further lost their cohesion as a firefight between the two forces ensued.

Tarleton ordered his reserve infantry battalion up to the left of his line for this assault, and the cavalry troop on his left to encircle the American line.

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This move outflanked the American line. Morgan and the third-line commander recognized the danger to their right flank and ordered the right flank units to "refuse" the flank. However, the American units adjoining those right flank units also commenced moving to the rear. This situation could have crumbled the American line except for Morgan's personal order for the rest of the American line to move to the rear with those right flank units. Final Battle Stage Seeing this apparent general withdrawal, Tarleton ordered his forces to close with the Americans.

They did, but suffered further disorganization. Just as the British attempted to close, the Americans turned and fired a volley, followed by a bayonet charge into the British lines.

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Simultaneously, Morgan's cavalry attacked the British right from the rear. Meanwhile, the militia, having reformed, returned to the field on the American right and attacked the British left flank units. The battle was over within an hour of Tarleton's first assault.

The British losses were killed, wounded, and prisoners, although Tarleton personally escaped with about of his cavalry.

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The British could not replace the mobile forces that Tarleton lost at the Cowpens. Without a mobile force, the British no longer had an effective counter to American partisans and light forces. The British later won at Guilford Court House, but suffered such heavy losses that they had to abandon their operations in the interior of the Carolinas. Morgan combined the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art to defeat superior numbers of British forces under Tarleton.

Morgan arrived at a unique and creative solution to his tactical problems. Trusted information about Tarleton's style was a crucial part of his deployment plan. Morgan understood the diverse military and social elements of his force untried militia, Continentals, and volunteers.

He asked no more of any element than it could deliver and used the strengths of each to the fullest. Daniel Morgan used tactical art to convert his understanding of American troops, knowledge of human nature, and rapport with his soldiers into the vital components of a brilliant tactical victory. A hasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs his immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders FRAGOsto perform activities with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution.

A deliberate operation is an operation in which a commander's detailed intelligence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task organizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the conduct of his decisive operation.

Most operations lie somewhere along a continuum between these two extremes.

tools of the tactician relationship

The 9th Armored Division's seizure of the bridge at Remagen in March illustrates one end, a hasty operation conducted with the forces immediately available. At the other end of the continuum is a deliberate operation, such as the 1st Infantry Division's breach operation during the opening hours of Operation Desert Storm. Ongoing improvements in information and C2 systems continue to assist in the development of a common operational picture of friendly and enemy forces while facilitating decision making and communicating decisions to friendly forces.

These improvements can help diminish the distinction between hasty and deliberate operations; they cannot make that distinction irrelevant. The commander must choose the right point along the continuum to operate.

His choice involves balancing several competing factors. He bases his decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate operation on his current knowledge of the enemy situation, and his assessment of whether the assets available to include timeand the means to coordinate and synchronize those assets, are adequate to accomplish the mission.

If they are not he takes additional time to plan and prepare for the operation or bring additional forces to bear on the problem. The commander makes that choice in an environment of uncertainty, which always entails some risk. The commander may have to act based only on his available combat information in a time-constrained environment.

Combat information is unevaluated data gathered by or provided to a commander that, due to its highly perishable nature or the critical nature of the tactical situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence or other staff products in time to meet the commander's information requirements FM The commander must understand the inherent risk of acting only on combat information since it is vulnerable to enemy deception operations and can be misinterpreted at any stage up through reporting channels.

The unit intelligence staff helps the commander assign a level of confidence to combat information he uses in decision making.

tools of the tactician relationship

Uncertainty and risk are inherent in tactical operations and cannot be eliminated. A commander cannot be successful without the capability of acting under conditions of uncertainty while balancing various risks and taking advantage of opportunities. Although the commander strives to maximize his knowledge about his forces, the terrain and weather, civil considerations, and the enemy, he cannot let a lack of information paralyze him.

The more intelligence on the enemy, the better able the commander is to make his assessment. Less information means that the commander has a greater risk of making a poor decision for the specific situation.

A commander never has perfect intelligence, but knowing when he has enough information to make a decision within the higher commander's intent and constraints is part of the art of tactics and is a critical skill for a commander.

The commander should take the minimum time necessary in planning and preparing to ensure a reasonable chance of success. Reduced coordination at the start of the operation results in less than optimum combat power brought to bear on the enemy, but often allows for increased speed and momentum while possibly achieving surprise. The commander must balance the effects of reduced coordination against the risk that the effects of increased coordination will not match the enemy's improved posture over time.

The more time the commander takes to prepare for the operation, including improving his situational understanding, the more time the enemy has to prepare and move additional units within supporting range or distance. Additionally, it reduces the time his subordinates have to conduct their own planning and preparations. If the enemy can improve his disposition faster than the friendly force can, the delays in execution decrease the commander's chances of success.

It is better to err on the side of speed, audacity, and momentum than on the side of caution when conducting military operations, all else being equal. Bold decisions give the best promise of success; however, one must differentiate between calculated risks and a military gamble. A calculated risk is an operation in which success is not a certainty but which, in case of failure, leaves sufficient forces to cope with whatever situations arise FM The willingness to take calculated risks requires military judgment to reduce risk by foresight and careful planning and to determine whether the risk is worth taking to grasp fleeting opportunities.

MG Wood's decision to advance east toward the German border with his 4th Armored Division after the breakout from the Normandy beachhead is an example of a justifiable calculated risk. A military gamble is an operation that can lead either to victory or to complete destruction of one's force FM Rare situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified; for example, when defeat is merely a matter of time and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.

LTC Chamberlain's decision to conduct a bayonet charge with what was left of the 20th Maine on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg is an example of a military gamble. The commander can be less deliberate in planning and preparing for an operation when facing a clearly less-capable and less-prepared enemy force.

In these circumstances, the commander can forego detailed planning, extensive rehearsals, and significant changes in task organization. For example, an attacking battalion task force encountering enemy security outposts just moving into position will conduct actions on contact to immediately destroy the outposts without the loss of momentum.

It then follows that against a larger and more prepared enemy, the commander needs more preparation time and a larger force to succeed. If the commander determines that he cannot defeat the enemy with the forces immediately at hand, he must determine what additional measures he must take to be successful.

The measures can include any or all of the factors along the continuum. This does not imply that a commander conducting a hasty operation foregoes the advantages provided by his combined arms team. A commander who chooses to conduct hasty operations synchronizes the employment of his forces in his head as he issues FRAGOs. He uses tangible and intangible factors, such as the training level and experience of his subordinates, his own experience, perception of how the enemy will react, understanding of time-distance factors, and knowledge of the strengths of each subordinate and supporting unit to achieve the required degree of synchronization.

An important factor in reducing a commander's risk is how much intelligence he has about the enemy. As intelligence becomes available, the commander determines where along the continuum of hasty versus deliberate operations he will operate to accomplish his mission. There is no set of rules to determine this point—any choice entails risk. If the commander decides to execute a hasty operation based on limited intelligence, he risks an uncoordinated operation against an enemy about which he knows little.

Moreover his forces may not be strong enough to accomplish their mission with minimum casualties. This could lead to piecemeal commitment and potential defeat in detail. He must balance this option against the risk of waiting to attack, which allows the enemy time to reinforce or conduct additional preparation. When higher headquarters determines the time to start an operation, or in a defense when the enemy initiates the operation, the commander has little flexibility regarding where to operate along the continuum of hasty versus deliberate operations.

In these situations he must use all the time available to conduct planning and preparation. While the military decision making process tasks used in a time-constrained environment are the same as in the full process, many are done mentally by the commander or with less staff involvement.

Each commander decides how to shorten the process. A commander may use the complete process to develop the plan, while a subordinate headquarters abbreviates the process.

See FM for a discussion of decision making in a time-constrained environment. The commander can reduce the risk associated with any situation by increasing his knowledge of the terrain and friendly, neutral, and enemy forces. He has a greater risk of making a poor decision if his situational understanding is incomplete or faulty.

If the commander lacks sufficient information to make an informed choice, his first priority must be to gain the required information to support his decision making while at the same time taking precautions to protect his force from surprise.

During an unexpected encounter with the enemy, often an acceptable way to gain that intelligence is to conduct a hasty attack to determine the size and disposition of the enemy force.

The commander adapts his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts to the existing situation and picks the appropriate tools to answer his critical information requirements. For example, the commander can retask his reconnaissance assets or increase the size of his reconnaissance effort.

A commander—supported by a digital C2 system that can access accurate, real-time information—takes advantage of a different operational environment than that facing a commander with an analog C2 system. Greatly improved knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations facilitates his employment of precision fires, his conduct of decisive maneuver at extended ranges, and his provision of responsive and flexible support of his forces.

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The integration of advanced information technologies, highly capable leaders, and agile organizational systems reduces risk and facilitates the conduct of full spectrum operations. Risk reduction does not always mean increasing knowledge of the enemy at the expense of time.

A commander can partially compensate for a lack of intelligence by being flexible in his troop dispositions through an increase in the depth of the security area, size and number of security units, and size of the reserve. The commander's choices of combat and movement formations provide the versatility to allow for initial enemy contact with the smallest possible friendly force.

This allows the greatest flexibility in meeting unforeseen enemy dispositions. Another way to compensate for increased risk is to allow time and resources for subordinate elements to develop the situation.

Because uncertainty exists in all military operations, every military decision contains risk. The commander exercises tactical art when he decides how much risk to accept.

As shown in Figurethe commander has several techniques available to reduce the risk associated in a specific operation. Some of these techniques for reducing risk take resources from the decisive operation, which reduces the concentration of effects at the decisive point.

tools of the tactician relationship

Risk Reduction Factors The commander has the option to redirect the efforts of forces previously used to reduce his risk toward strengthening his decisive operation as more information becomes available.

In any operation, the relationship between information, uncertainty, risk, size of reserves and security forces, and the disposition of the main body may change frequently. The creation of this object has several dependencies. Therefore Tactician includes ClassNameExtractor which does exactly that. HandlerLocator We also need an instance of HandlerLocator which will find the correct Handler based on the name of the Command.

Tactician provides two implementations of this interface: Using CallableLocator is useful when resolving a Handler from a container. The inflector returns the name of the method that expects the Command passed to it. Tactician helps us out again by providing implementations for several popular conventions. Tactician is now configured.

Executing the Command To create an instance of a Command, we fill out all the required constructor requirements: Architectural Boundary One of the most important benefits is the architectural boundary that surrounds your Application. Upper layers, such as the User Interface, can send a Command to a lower layer, across the boundary and through the consistent interface provided by the Command Bus.

Boundaries aid separation of concerns and free one side from worrying about the other. High-level layers no longer have the burden of knowing exactly how a task is completed — and lower layers do not need to worry about the context in which they are being used. Framework and Client Decoupling Applications surrounded with boundaries are agnostic to their framework.

They do not deal with HTTP requests or cookies. All properties needed to perform behavior get passed along as part of the Command payload. Decoupling from your framework allows you to maintain your Application as a framework changes or updates — and makes it easier to test. This inherently means that the intention of conducting an action is separate from the execution, otherwise there would be no need for a Command Bus. Commands are named using the language of the business and explicitly describe how an application can be used.

Serializing a Command becomes much easier when it does not need to know how to perform the behavior. In Distributed Systems, a message could be generated on one system — but performed on another, written in a different language on a different operating system. When all a unit of code does is produce a message, it is extremely easy to test. The Command Bus injected into the unit can be replaced and the message can be asserted.

We always discuss the communication between him and Dan to make sure it is going smoothly. I want them to leave the dock confident. We discuss the goals of the day, review any issues we had the day before, and finally, any foreseeable issues that may come up on the course. How important is it to get to a venue early and what did the team focus on in Newport? We want to sail two full days before each event. We spent most first days this summer working on a strong fast forward mode, followed up with blow through gybes.

The 2nd day is always full race mode, we work on boat speed, racing starts and mark roundings. Our goal, on the last day of practice is to feel as though we are the best prepared team in the fleet for the 1st day of racing. The most important information any coach can bring back each day is an honest and realistic analysis of what happened during day on the course.

It amazes me how the view of the team and view of the coach can be so different on tight, close situations.